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This paper provides an interpretation of the uncertainty that exists at the
beginning of the day of an election as to who will win. It is based on the
theory that there are a number of possible conditions of nature that can exist
on election day, of which one is drawn. Political betting markets like Intrade
provide a way of trying to estimate this uncertainty. It is argued that polling
standard errors do not provide estimates of this type of uncertainty. They
instead estimate sample-size uncertainty, which can be driven close to zero
with a large enough sample.
This paper also introduces a ranking assumption concerning dependencies
across U.S. states, which puts restrictions on the possible conditions of nature
than can exist on election day. The joint hypothesis that the last-day Intrade
ranking is correct and the ranking assumption is correct predicts the exact
outcomes of the 2004 presidential election and the 2006 Senate election.
Although not a test of the ranking assumption, there is evidence that the
Intrade traders used the ranking assumption to price contracts in the 2004
presidential election. This was not the case, however, in the 2006 Senate
election. Finally, it is shown if the ranking assumption is correct, the two
political parties should spend all their money on a few states, which seems
consistent with their actual behavior in 2004.
∗Cowles Foundation and International Center for Finance, Yale University, New Haven, CT
06520-8281. Voice: 203-432-3715; Fax: 203-432-6167; email: ray.fair@yale.edu; website:
http://fairmodel.econ.yale.edu. I am indebted to Keith Chen, Don Green, Ed Kaplan, SteveMorris,
Sharon Oster, JustinWolfers, and Eric Zitzewitz for helpful discussions and comments and toMike
Knesevitch at Intrade for supplying me with some of the data. This paper is a substantially revised
version of an earlier paper entitled Predicting Electoral College Victory Probabilities from State
Probability Data, November 2004.
1 Introduction
At the beginning of the day of an election, after all the campaigning has been
completed, there is still uncertainty as to who will win. This paper provides an
interpretation of what this uncertainty is. The theory is that there are a number
of possible conditions of nature that can exist on election day, of which one is
drawn on election day. The uncertainty is which condition will be drawn. Section
2 presents this theory. Section 3 then discusses a way in which this uncertainty
can be estimated using political betting markets. Section 3 also discusses the use
of polling standard errors to estimate uncertainty. It is argued that polling standard
errors do not provide estimates of the type of uncertainty considered in this paper.
The rest of the paper is concerned with an assumption about dependencies across
U.S. states, called the ranking assumption, that puts restrictions on the possible
conditions of nature than can exist on election day. This assumption is discussed
and examined empirically in Section 4. Section 5 is concerned with the question of
how the two political parties should behave regarding campaign spending across
states in U.S. presidential elections if the ranking assumption is correct.
2 The Theory
It is assumed that on election day there aren possible conditions of nature regarding
the events thatwill take place during the day, eachwith probability 1/nof occurring.
If in p percent of the n conditions candidate A wins, then p is the probability that
A wins. The theory is that there are many possible conditions left at the end of
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a campaign and that the uncertainty is which condition will be drawn. Even if
one knew the n possible conditions of nature, the best that one could say at the
beginning of election day is that A would win with probability p.
An alternative way of thinking about the beginning of election day is that there
is only one condition of nature left. In this case if one knew the condition, the
outcome would be known with certainty. There are many reasons, however, to
think that there is more than one possible condition left. The weather is not known
with certainty, and weather may affect turnout, which may benet one candidate
relative to the other. A voter's decision may be affected by events that happens to
him or her a few hours before he or she enters the voting booth, and there may be
more than one set of possible events. For example, in condition of nature 1 a voter
driving to vote may glance at a sign that affects his vote, whereas in condition of
nature 2 the voter does not see the sign because someone is honking behind him.
Perhaps in one condition of nature a voter runs into a friend on the way to vote
and the friend convinces her to vote for candidate A, whereas in another condition
of nature she does not run into the friend and does not vote for A. Implicit in this
theory is the view that people's voting decisions are affected by what happens to
them during the day and that there are a number of possible things that can happen
to them. Also, people's feelings and moods may vary from day to day, and so there
may be a number of possible ways they can feel on election day. In short, the die
has not been cast at the time the election begins.
Let S denote the set of possible conditions of nature on election day. During
the course of a campaign, many things happen that can affect S. If, for example,
candidate A does poorly in a debate, this may eliminate a number of possible
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conditions of nature that otherwise would have existed on election day in which A
wins. S is thus different than it otherwise would have been had A not done poorly
in the debate. One can think of a campaign as trying to eliminate as many possible
conditions of nature as possible in which its candidate loses.
It may be the case that S contains almost no possible conditions of nature
in which one candidate loses a particular state. For example, in the 2004 U.S.
presidential election, there were probably very few possible conditions of nature
in which President Bush lost Texas. S could still be a large set, but a set in which
almost all conditions contain a Bush win in Texas.
3 Estimating Uncertainty
Political Betting Markets
Political betting markets provide one way of trying to estimate the uncertainty
just discussed. The market considered in this paper is Intrade.1 Prior to the 2004
U.S. presidential election the websitewww.intrade.com allowed one to buy and sell
contracts for each state and the District of Columbia. The contract for Iowa, for
example, stated GWBush to win the electoral votes of Iowa. The contracts were
in units of ten dollars, and a price of 55.0 meant that you could buy one contract
for $5.50. If Bush won Iowa, you would get back $10.00. Otherwise, you would
get back nothing. You could also sell the contract, winning $5.50 if Bush lost and
losing $4.50 if Bush won. There was also a national contract that stated George
1The Intrade data are sometimes referred to as Tradesports data. Intrade is a subdivision of
Tradesports, and the data are the same.
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W Bush is re-elected as United States President. There were also contracts for
various combinations of state victories. For example, there was a Bush Greatplains
contract that stated Pres George W Bush to win IA, KS, MN, NE, ND, OK, SD,
& TX. The national contract was by far the most traded contract on Intrade. The
markets for many of the state contracts were fairly thin. An interesting discussion
of this market and others like it is in Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2004a).
Let pi denote the percent of the possible conditions of nature inwhichBushwins
state i. One possible estimate of pi is the Intrade price that existed at the beginning
of election day.2 For example, a price of, say, 53.9 for Florida is interpreted as
saying that the market expects that in 53.9 percent of the possible conditions of
nature on election day Bush wins Florida.
The fth column in Table 1 presents the prices of the state contracts that existed
at 6:00 am Eastern time on the day of the election, November 2, 2004. This is the
time at which the rst poll opened. (Ignore for now columns one through four in
Table 1.) The states are ranked in Table 1 by the prices in the fth column, i.e.,
the prices on the last day. Many of the states have prices close to 100.0, and many
have prices close to 0.0. A price close to 100.0 in the present context means that
the market expects that there are very few possible conditions of nature in which
Bush loses the state. The opposite is the case for prices close to 0.0.
Regarding the prices in Table 1, if one excludes the top 25 states through
Missouri, which has a price of 87.1, and the bottom 15 states beginning with
2Manski (2004) has shown that under certain assumptions about the beliefs of traders the market
price of a contract is not necessarily the mean belief of the traders. However, under what appear
to be plausible assumptions, this bias is either zero or smallsee Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2004b).






State 9/7 9/21 10/5 10/19 11/2 Votes Votes
Montana 95.0 94.0 95.0 96.3 99.0 3 3
Oklahoma 97.0 97.0 97.0 97.0 98.4 7 10
Utah 96.0 97.0 97.0 97.5 98.0 5 15
Idaho 95.5 96.0 95.0 95.5 98.0 4 19
Texas 98.0 98.0 98.0 98.0 97.9 34 53
Wyoming 97.0 97.0 97.0 97.5 97.6 3 56
Indiana 96.0 96.0 91.2 94.4 97.4 11 67
Alaska 96.0 96.0 98.0 95.5 97.4 3 70
Louisiana 92.5 91.9 92.0 92.6 97.0 9 79
Tennessee 78.7 85.0 89.0 92.0 96.5 11 90
Kentucky 92.5 92.0 92.0 93.1 95.8 8 98
Kansas 96.0 96.0 93.5 94.1 95.8 6 104
Mississippi 96.0 96.0 94.0 94.5 95.6 6 110
Georgia 96.5 97.0 92.2 95.7 95.2 15 125
Alabama 98.0 96.0 94.0 96.5 95.2 9 134
Nebraska 96.0 97.5 94.0 95.7 95.2 5 139
South Carolina 95.0 97.0 91.0 93.7 95.1 8 147
North Dakota 96.0 96.0 92.5 95.5 95.1 3 150
South Dakota 96.0 96.0 92.0 95.7 95.1 3 153
North Carolina 81.0 93.0 87.5 89.0 94.7 15 168
Arizona 78.0 83.0 83.0 90.0 94.0 10 178
Virginia 86.0 91.0 87.5 87.8 93.2 13 191
West Virginia 67.7 77.0 77.0 79.9 92.0 5 196
Arkansas 73.0 78.0 84.0 82.0 90.0 6 202
Missouri 67.0 85.0 84.0 81.0 87.1 11 213
Colorado 75.5 76.0 75.0 79.4 77.0 9 222
Nevada 60.0 69.9 74.5 67.5 76.8 5 227
New Mexico 43.0 40.0 37.7 37.2 56.5 5 232
Florida 60.5 70.0 63.5 66.0 53.9 27 259
Ohio 63.0 72.0 67.5 57.8 51.1 20 279
Iowa 43.0 55.0 57.0 55.2 51.0 7
Wisconsin 57.0 62.0 64.0 54.5 41.0 10
New Hampshire 42.0 55.0 51.0 43.0 31.0 4
Pennsylvania 43.4 43.0 35.0 38.0 28.9 21
Hawaii 10.0 10.0 8.0 5.5 26.1 4
Minnesota 40.0 40.5 35.5 38.5 24.0 10
Michigan 33.0 29.9 23.0 19.9 11.1 17
New Jersey 15.9 24.0 18.0 16.5 10.0 15
Oregon 36.3 35.0 26.9 21.9 10.0 7
Maine 27.4 26.2 26.5 24.0 9.2 4
Delaware 16.0 18.0 13.0 9.6 5.1 3
California 9.6 11.4 8.0 6.0 3.3 55
Connecticut 8.0 7.0 7.0 5.7 3.3 7
Washington 28.0 25.0 19.0 8.0 3.0 11
Vermont 7.0 8.0 8.0 3.3 2.5 3
Illinois 8.8 12.0 8.8 6.8 2.0 21
Maryland 14.0 16.0 17.9 9.0 2.0 10
New York 7.0 9.9 8.4 4.9 1.7 31
Massachusetts 3.0 4.0 2.0 2.8 1.7 12
Rhode Island 4.0 4.0 4.0 3.5 1.7 4
DC 1.0 1.0 2.0 1.5 0.8 3
• Votes are electoral votes. 269 votes are needed to win for President Bush.
• President Bush won Iowa, all the states above it, and none below it.
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Michigan, which has a price of 11.1, there are 11 states left, ranging fromMinnesota
with a price of 24.0 to Coloradowith a price of 77.0. The 3 closest states are Florida
(53.9), Ohio (51.1), and Iowa (51.0). The prices from these 11 states are analyzed
below.
Polling Standard Errors
Although polling standard errors are commonly used to estimate uncertainty, this
type of uncertainty is not the same as the type that is of concern in this paper. In
other words, the type of uncertainty discussed in Section 2 is not the type estimated
by polling standard errors. Almost all polling organizations release both a mean
prediction and a standard error of the mean prediction, and these standard errors
estimate sample-size uncertainty. The larger the sample, the smaller the standard
error. To see why this uncertainty is different from that discussed in Section 2,
consider the extreme case in which every eligible voter were asked the day before
the election whether he or she was planning to vote and for whom. This would
yield a mean vote share with a standard error of zero.3 On this score, there would
be no uncertainty left, whereas the uncertainty discussed in Section 2 would still
exist.
To examine uncertainty estimates from polling standard errors versus those
from political betting markets, one can compare the probability of winning a state
that is backed out from state polling data with the probability as estimated by the
3Even if the sample size were, say, only 100,000 eligible voters rather than all eligible voters,
the standard error would be close to zero. For a binomial distribution with p equal to .5 and N
equal to 100,000, the standard error of the mean is .0016.
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Intrade price. Table 2 makes this comparison for the 11 states mentioned above
except Hawaii. The polling data are from the Real Clear Politics (RCP) website.4
Results for the Zogby poll were used along with the RCP average of a number of
polls. The last date of the polls was November 1. (Hawaii was not used because the
last date of a poll for it was October 20.) The sample size for each Zogby state poll
was 601 likely voters. Zogby reported its standard error as 2.05 percent for each
state, which is consistent with the sample size of 601 for a binomial distribution.
The state standard errors on the RCP website varied for the different polls from
about 1.5 to 2.5 percent, with the sample sizes varying from about 500 to 1,500.
The backed out probabilities for Zogby in Table 2 are based the assumption of a
normal distribution and a standard error of 2.05 percent. No standard errors were
reported for the RCP average, and two choices are used in Table 2, 2.05 percent
and 1.0 percent. The 1.0 standard error is consistent with a sample size of about
3,000. If the RCP average is an average of ve polls, each with a sample size of
600, the total sample size is 3,000. Table 2 also lists for each state for Zogby and
for the RCP average the estimated two-party vote share for Bush.
If the Intrade prices are picking up uncertainty not accounted for in the polling
standard errors, i.e., the type of uncertainty discussed in Section 2, then one should
expect for large sample sizes that the probabilities backed out of the polling data
to be closer to either 0 or 100 than are the Intrade prices. Large sample sizes imply
small polling standard errors and thus backed-out probabilities that are likely to be
close to 0 or 100. In the present case it is unclear whether a standard error of 2.05




Intrade Prices versus Polling Data
Backed out
Intrade Probability Bush Share
State Price Zogbya RCPa RCPb Zogby RCP
Colorado 77.0 68.7 90.6 99.6 51.0 52.7
Nevada 76.8 89.8 94.6 99.9 52.6 53.3
New Mexico 56.5 23.2 63.4 75.8 48.5 50.7
Florida 53.9 50.0 55.8 61.8 50.0 50.3
Ohio 51.1 94.6 70.4 86.4 53.3 51.1
Iowa 51.0 10.2 53.9 57.9 47.4 50.2
Wisconsin 41.0 6.5 59.6 69.1 46.9 50.5
New Hampshire 31.0 NA 40.4 30.8 NA 49.5
Pennsylvania 28.9 15.3 40.4 30.8 47.9 49.5
Minnesota 24.0 6.5 20.4 4.5 46.9 48.3
a Backed out probability based on a standard error of 2.05.
a Backed out probability based on a standard error of 1.00.
• RCP is the Real Clear Politics average of a number of polls.
out that it does hold for all but 4 of the 19 cases in Table 2 that use a standard
error of 2.05 percent and for all but one of the 10 cases that use a standard error
of 1.0 percent. For example, the Ohio Intrade price is 51.1, while the polling
probabilities are 94.6, 70.4, and 86.4. For Wisconsin the Intrade price is 41.0 and
the probabilities are 6.5, 59.6, and 69.1. In this case Zogby and RCP disagreed as
to who would win, but both were more condent than Intrade. The 4 exceptions
that use a standard error of 2.05 are Zogby Colorado (77.0 versus 68.7), Zogby
Florida (53.9 versus 50.0), RCP New Hampshire (31.0 versus 40.4), and RCP
Pennsylvania (28.9 versus 40.4). The one exception that uses a standard error of
1.0 is RCP Pennsylvania (28.9 versus 30.8).
An interesting example using backed-out probabilities from polling data is in
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Leigh and Wolfers (2006). They nd using data from the 2004 Australian election
that they need to increase the polling standard errors to about 10 percent to get
backed-out probabilities that are close to those from political betting markets. (A
standard error of 10 percent is equivalent to a poll of only 25 voters.) They suggest
(p. 334) from these results that pollsters' published margins of error should at
least be doubled. The interpretation in the present paper, however, is simply
that pollsters are estimating a different type of uncertainty. They are estimating
sample-size uncertainty, whereas political betting markets are estimating the type
of uncertainty discussed in Section 2. Even there is no sample-size uncertainty,
there is still uncertainty.
If there were no uncertainty at the beginning of election day except sample-
size uncertainty, then the Intrade prices would just be picking up the uncertainty
reected in the polling standard errors, i.e., in the polling sample sizes. In this case
the Intrade prices would also approach 0 or 100 as the sample sizes increase. The
results in Table 2, however, do not support this hypothesis. As noted above, most
of the backed out probabilities from the polls are closer to 0 or 100 than are the
Intrade prices, and generally they are quite different from the Intrade prices. This
suggests that the backed-out probabilities and the Intrade prices are estimating
different things, which is the argument of this paper. The results for the 2004
Australian election in Leigh and Wolfers (2006) also support this view.
Regarding the use of Intrade prices to estimate the type of uncertainty discussed
in Section 2, one cannot rule out the possibility that these prices are in part affected
by polling standard errors. So part of the uncertainty reected in the Intrade prices
might be sample-size uncertainty. If this is true, this bias will fall as the sample
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sizes increase, but if there is uncertainty of the type discussed in Section 2, the
Intrade prices will not approach 0 or 100 as the sample sizes increase.
4 The Ranking Assumption: A Restriction on the
Possible Conditions of Nature
The Ranking Assumption
The rest of this paper is concerned with an assumption about dependencies across
U.S. states. It uses the conditions of nature framework in Section 2. The assump-
tion, called the ranking assumption, puts restrictions on the possible conditions
of nature than can exist on election day.
The assumption is easy to describe. Rank the states by pi, as is done in Table 1
using the Intrade data. The assumption is then that there is no condition of nature
in which Bush wins state i and loses a state ranked higher than i. If, for example,
Texas is ranked higher than Massachusetts, then in none of the n conditions of
nature does Bush win Massachusetts and lose Texas. There may be conditions in
which Bush wins Massachusetts (Kerry makes some serious error), but in these
conditions Bush also wins Texas.5
It is common in previous work to assume some form of independence. Kaplan
andBarnett (2003) assume that the state outcomes are independent, that the events
that the candidate is leading in various states are mutually independent (p. 33).
Snyder (1989) analyzes districts and assumes that the elections in the districts are
5Ed Kaplan has pointed out to me that given a ranking like in Table 1, under the ranking assump-
tion there are only 52 possible outcomes: Bush takes all 51, Bush takes all but the last one, Bush
takes all but the last two, etc. This compares to 251 possible outcomes, about 2.25 million billion.
A remarkable economy of outcomes has been achieved by the ranking assumption!
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all statistically independent. He points out that this rules out uncertainty about
national variables that may affect the electoral outcomes in all districts simulta-
neously, such as changes in aggregate output or foreign policy crises (p. 646).
Brams and Davis (1974) assume that the voting of uncommitted voters within
each state is statistically independent (p. 120). Strömberg (2002) assumes that
the state level popularity parameters of a candidate are independent, although he
also has a national popularity parameter. Soumbatiants, Chappell, and Johnson
(2006) have both national and state-specic shocks.
What would it mean in the present context for the state probabilities to be
independent? On election day the probability of Bush winning state i is simply the
percent of his state i wins in the n possible conditions of nature. The probabilities
will, of course, change if the n possible conditions of nature change. Consider as
a thought experiment different sets of n possible conditions of nature on election
day. Say that Bush has done poorly in the debates in set 1 and well in set 2. One
would expect all the state probabilities to be higher for Bush in set 2. In set 2
there would fewer conditions of nature in which Bush loses any given state. The
state probabilities in this case would be positively correlated. In order for the
probabilities to be uncorrelated, the sets must differ in state-specic ways. For
example, the Republican party might be better organized in California in set 1
than in set 2, but everything else the same. The two sets would then differ only
regarding the probability for California. These state-specic differences across
different sets of the n possible conditions of nature seem less likely to occur than
differences that affect all the state probabilities.
The ranking assumption does not, of course, directly concern different sets of
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the n possible conditions of nature. It simply puts restrictions on the n possible
conditions of nature that exist on election day. If state i is ranked ahead of state j,
then in no condition of nature does Bush win j and lose i. The concept of different
sets of the n possible conditions of nature is not needed.
Tests of the Ranking Assumption using Intrade Data
After the outcome of the 2004 election the joint hypothesis that 1) the Intrade price
ranking on the last day is correct and 2) the ranking assumption is correct can be
tested. Under this joint hypothesis President Bush should not have won any state
ranked below a state that he lost. Table 1 shows that he did not win any such state.
Bush won Iowa, all the states above Iowa, and none below Iowa. The actual results
are exactly as the joint hypothesis predicted.
Note from Table 1 that Bush won all the states with a price above 50 on the last
day and lost all the states with a price below 50. Although this is obviously a plus
for Intrade, it is not necessary for the joint hypothesis to be true. If, say, all the
prices on the last day were 10 percent lower, so that the price of Iowa were 45.9
rather than 51.0, the results would still have been exactly as the joint hypothesis
predicted even though Bush would have won Iowa with a price below 50.
Another test of the joint hypothesis can be made using Intrade data for the 2006
U.S. Senate election. Table 3 presents the last transaction price and the average of
the bid and ask prices as of 6:00 AM on election day, November 7, 2006, for the
seven states that were at all in play. Even for these seven states trading was thin,
which is the reason for presenting both the last transaction price and the average
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Table 3
Intrade Prices at 6:00 AM on November 7, 2006
The Prices are for a Democratic Win for the Senate
Average of
State Last Bid & Ask Bid Ask
1 New Jersey 87.8 92.3 90.5 94.0
2 Montana 79.9 78.8 75.0 82.6
3 Rhode Island 76.0 65.8 63.5 68.0
4 Maryland 70.2 72.5 71.0 74.0
5 Missouri 56.9 59.4 57.2 61.5
6 Virginia 53.5 55.0 54.0 56.0
7 Tennessee 12.0 15.0 12.0 18.0
• The Democrats won all but Tennessee.
of the bid and ask prices. The separate bid and ask prices are also presented to get a
sense of the market. The states are ranked in the table by the last transaction price.
The ranking assumption says that the Democrats should not lose any state
ranked above a state they won, and this was the case for the 2006 Senate races.
The lowest ranked state that they won was Virginia (Virginia ranks lowest using
either measure), and they won everything above Virginia. So as was the case
for the 2004 presidential election, the 2006 Senate results are exactly as the joint
hypothesis that the last-day Intrade ranking is correct and the ranking assumption
is correct predicted.
It is also the case that Intrade is perfect for the Senate races in that theDemocrats
won every state with a price above 50 and no state with a price below 50. As noted
above, Intrade does not have to be perfect in order for the ranking assumption
to be perfect. For example, if the Democrats had lost Virginia, contrary to In-
trade's prediction, the results would still have been exactly as the joint hypothesis
predicted.
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Do Intrade Traders Use the Ranking Assumption?
Unlike the above comparisons to the actual outcomes, the following is not a test of
the ranking assumption. It is instead an examination of whether the Intrade traders
are using the ranking assumption to price various contracts.
For this examination four other days of Intrade prices were sampled. These
are presented in the rst four columns in Table 1. The rst date is September 7,
2004, the day after Labor Day. The other three are two weeks apart. The time of
day is 10:00 am Eastern for the rst, third, and fourth and 11:00 am Eastern for
the second.
First, note that under the ranking assumption it is trivial to compute, given the
individual state prices for any particular day, the probability that Bush wins in the
Electoral College. Rank the states as is done in Table 1 for the last day and then
go down the ranking, adding electoral votes, until 269 is reached. If this is state j,
then state j is pivotal, and the probability that Bush wins the election is simply
the probability that he wins state j.
Now, given the individual state prices in Table 1, it turns out that the Intrade
prices of various combination contracts are quite close to what one would expect
if traders were using the ranking assumption. This can be seen in Table 4, which
presents prices for various combination contracts along with what the ranking as-
sumptionwould predict the prices should be andwhat the independence assumption
would predict. For the Bush Greatplains contract, for example, the price predicted
by the ranking assumption is the price of the lowest ranked state in the contract,
which for September 7 is Minnesota with a price of 40.0. The price predicted by
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Table 4
Intrade Prices for Various Contracts
September 7, 2004 November 2, 2004
Predicted Predicted Predicted Predicted
by by by by
Intrade Ranking Independ. Intrade Ranking Independ.
Contract Price Assumption Assumption Price Assumption Assumption
Bush Greatplains 35.0 40.0 13.9 23.0 24.0 9.7
Bush OH+FL 56.9 60.5 38.1 37.0 51.1 27.5
Bush South 55.0 60.5 18.9 53.0 53.9 32.3
Bush Southwest 36.0 43.0 18.7 53.8 56.5 32.7
Kerry New England 53.7 58.0 33.5 70.0 69.0 57.1
Kerry Rustbelt 32.0 37.0 14.0 42.5 48.9 30.9
Kerry Westcoast 63.5 63.7 41.5 87.5 90.0 84.4
Notes:
• Greatplains: IA, KS, MN, NE, ND, OK, SD, & TX.
• South: SC, MS, FL, AL, GA, LA, TX, VA, AR, NC, & TN.
• Southwest: NV, NM, UT, & CO.
• New England: CT, RI, ME, VT, MA, & NH.
• Rustbelt: PA, OH, & MI.
•Westcoast: CA, OR, & WA.
the independence assumption is simply the product of the state prices (after dividing
each price by 100 and multiplying the nal product by 100).
It is clear from Table 4 that the predictions are much closer under the rank-
ing assumption than under the independence assumption. The worst case for the
independence assumption is Bush South, where for September 7 the ranking- as-
sumption price is 60.5, the price for Florida, and the independence-assumption
price is 18.9. These compare to the actual price of the contract of 55.0. The only
weak case for the ranking assumption is Bush OH+FL for November 2, where the
contract price is 37.0 and the price predicted by the ranking assumption is 51.1.
Although the results in Table 4 have to be taken with some caution because the
markets are thinly traded, they are supportive of the view that the Intrade traders
are using the ranking assumption to price the combination contracts.
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Table 5
Intrade Data on the National Contract
9/7 9/21 10/5 10/19 11/2
National Contract 60.2 70.0 60.0 58.5 55.5
Pivotal State 60.5 70.0 63.5 57.8 a51.1
FL FL FL OH OH
aBid/ask spread was 50.0/55.5.
Table 5 shows the price of the national contract on each of the ve days and the
price of the pivotal state. Remember that under the ranking assumption the two
prices should be the same. The table shows that the prices are quite close. On the
last day the prices differ by 4.4, but the bid/ask spread for Ohio was quite large,
and so the Ohio price may not be reliable.
Turning now to the 2006 Senate election, a widely traded contract on Intrade
was one that stated that the Republicans would retain control of the Senate. This
would have happened had the Republicans taken one of the rst six states in Table 3
plus Tennessee (which according to Intrade was not close). If traders were using
the ranking assumption, the price of this contract should have been 46.5, one
minus the price for Virginia (using the last price). Under the assumption that the
probabilities of the rst six states are independent (and everything else certain),
the price of the contract should have been 88.6, one minus the product of the six
probabilities (using the last prices). The actual price at 6:00 AM was 66.4 using
the last price and 67.2 using the average of the bid and ask prices (bid was 66.4, ask
was 67.9). So the market price was almost exactly halfway between the ranking
assumption price and the independence assumption price. The actual price is in
fact consistent with the use of independence assumption for Missouri and Virginia
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and certainty otherwise. In this case the price should have been 69.6, one minus
the product of the two probabilities (using the last prices), which is close to the
actual. So in this case the traders were not using the ranking assumption to price the
Republican-control contract. They, of course, should have, given that the actual
results were exactly as the joint hypothesis of a correct Intrade ranking and the
ranking assumption predicted. Those who ignored the ranking assumption and
bought the contract (assuming, say, independence for Missouri and Virginia) lost.
5 Political Party Responses to Uncertainty
Estimation Errors
This section shows that if the ranking assumption holds, the two political parties
in a presidential election should spend money in only a few states. It is rst
necessary to consider what it means within the context of this paper for the prices
in Table 1 to change across time and in some cases to change the ranking of the
states. It is important to realize that these changes, even changes in ranking, are
not inconsistent with the ranking assumption because the assumption pertains only
to the ranking on the last day.
Let pi denote the probability that Bush wins state i on election day, which is
the percent of the n conditions of nature in which Bush wins state i. Assume that
these probabilities are estimated precisely by the Intrade prices on the day before
the electionthe prices in the last price column in Table 1.
Consider the prices on September 7, about two months before the election. Let
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p̂it denote the price for state i on date t, where in this case t is September 7. Let
uit denote the estimation error for state i and date t:
uit = p̂it − pi. (1)
For t equal to September 7, uit for a given state is the difference between the rst
price column in Table 1 and the last price column. Surprises that happen between,
say, September 7 and election day will change the estimated probabilities (and thus
prices) as people update their views about the conditions of nature that will exist
on election day. A surprise negative performance by Bush in the debates would
likely lower nearly all the estimated probabilities. If all the estimated probabilities
fell by the same amount, there would be no change in the ranking. The fact that
the ranking in Table 1 changes somewhat over time means that some surprises are
state specic. There are thus state specic components in uit in (1).
Stochastic Simulation
Before considering the spending strategy of the two parties, it will be useful to
examine the effects of state-specic variation in the estimation errors. This is
done in Table 6 using stochastic simulation. To focus on state-specic variation,
the errors are taken for the simulation work to be uncorrelated across states. The
states used are the 13 states with prices between 30.0 and 70.0 on September 7.
For the results in Table 6 t is September 7. For each state i, uit is assumed to be





Data for September 7, 2004
Value of σ




median .600 .597 .592 .588 .582 .576
minimum .600 .559 .522 .481 .439 .409
.05 .600 .583 .567 .551 .533 .515
# times pivotal state
WV 0 0 0 48 111 180
MO 0 0 9 91 254 400
OH 0 50 705 1416 1962 2199
FL 0 3560 4185 4278 4185 4057
NV 10000 6218 4113 2913 2236 1814
WI 0 172 988 1254 1235 1197
PA 0 0 0 0 8 84
IA 0 0 0 0 3 26
NM 0 0 0 0 2 18
NH 0 0 0 0 4 10
MN 0 0 0 0 0 13
OR 0 0 0 0 0 1
MI 0 0 0 0 0 1
# times pivotal state or above
WV 10000 10000 9999 9978 9906 9783
MO 10000 10000 10000 9982 9927 9807
OH 10000 10000 10000 10000 9997 9955
FL 10000 10000 10000 10000 9996 9943
NV 10000 9819 8733 8122 7869 7753
WI 0 248 2100 3616 4556 5208
PA 0 0 0 0 10 101
IA 0 0 0 0 12 104
NM 0 0 0 0 11 97
NH 0 0 0 0 8 50
MN 0 0 0 0 1 21
OR 0 0 0 0 0 2
MI 0 0 0 0 0 1
• The prices (base probabilities) from Table 1 for September 7 are:
WV 67.7, MO 67.0, OH 63.0, FL 60.5, NV 60.0, WI 57.0, PA 43.4,
IA 43.0, NM 43.0, NH 42.0, MN 40.0, OR 36.3, MI 33.0.
• 10000 trials per value of σ.
• p(k)v = probability of winning the election for the kth trial,
which is the probability of winning the pivotal state.
• .05 for p(k)v means the value below which 5 percent of the
trial values lie.
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The stochastic-simulation experiments were performed as follows. For each
trial 13 errors were drawn from the N(0, σ2) distribution, one per state, where σ
varied from zero for the rst experiment to 0.05 for the sixth experiment. Consider
a given experiment, i.e., a given value of σ. Let u
(k)
it denote the error drawn for
state i on the kth trial. The probability for state i on the kth trial was computed as:
p
(k)
it = p̂it + u
(k)
it . (2)
In this context p̂it is the base probability. For each trial k the values of p
(k)
it were
ranked, the pivotal state was determined,6 and its probability, denoted p
(k)
pt , was
recorded. This was done 10,000 times, resulting in 10,000 values of p
(k)
pt . The
number of times a particular state was the pivotal state was also recorded, as was
the number of times a state was above the pivotal state. Presented in Table 6 are
the minimum value of p
(k)
pt , the value below which 5 percent of the trial values lie,
and the median. Also presented are the number of times each state was pivotal and
the number of times each state was pivotal or above the pivotal.7
The results in Table 6 are easy to explain. When the variance is zero, Nevada
is always pivotal and the probability of winning the election is always .600.8 As
the variance increases, more and more states are sometimes pivotal or above the
6For this work 270, not 269, was taken to be the number of electoral votes needed to win.
7It can be the case in the stochastic simulations that p
(k)
it for a particular state i is greater than
the base probability for states above the highest ranked state used (West Virginia) or less than the
base probability for states below the lowest ranked state used (Michigan). This does not matter for
the results, however, because the solutions that matter are around the pivotal state. The stochastic
simulation could have been set up using all the states, but, as just noted, this is not necessary. If
all states were used, the assumption that the variance of the error is the same across states would
have to be changed. The variance is obviously smaller when the base probability is near one or
zero than when it is near one half.
8In Table 4 Florida is listed as the pivotal state for September 7, whereas in Table 6 Nevada is
listed as pivotal. This difference is due to the use of 270 electoral votes to win rather than 269.
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pivotal. The median of p
(k)
pt falls from .600 when σ is zero to .576 when σ is 0.05.
Themedian falls because, except forWisconsin, the states belowNevada have base
probabilities that are considerably below .600. There is not symmetry around .600,
and so negative draws for states above Nevada are on average not completely offset
by positive draws for states below Nevada. When the calculations were repeated
using .570 for the base probabilities for the states below Wisconsin (instead of
the values in Table 1 for September 7), the median of p
(k)
pt rose as the variance
increased. For σ = 0.01 the median was .597. The values of the median for the
increasing values of σ were, respectively, .598, .600, .603, and .605.
When σ is zero, i.e., no state-specic variation, all that matters in terms of
predicting the probability of winning the election is the probability for the pivotal
state. It does not matter, for example, how much larger the probabilities for the
states above the pivotal state are or howmuch smaller the probabilities for the states
below the pivotal state are. As just seen, this changes when σ is non zerothe
sizes of the probabilities around the pivotal state now matter.
The stochastic simulations were repeated using the September 21 data (t =
September 21), and the results are presented in Table 7. These results are similar
to those in Table 7, although with higher probabilities, except that some states are
now never pivotal nor above the pivotal. The fact that the base probabilities for
Iowa and New Hampshire have risen substantially leads to these states doing all




Data for September 21, 2004
Value of σ




median .699 .694 .688 .680 .673 .667
minimum .699 .658 .617 .576 .534 .492
.05 .699 .680 .660 .642 .623 .606
# times pivotal state
MO 0 0 0 0 2 7
WV 0 0 4 78 187 296
OH 0 219 1100 1733 2103 2333
FL 0 4553 4264 4016 3870 3819
NV 10000 5228 4610 3898 3265 2648
WI 0 0 22 268 532 743
IA 0 0 0 3 27 80
NH 0 0 0 4 14 74
# times pivotal state or above
WV 10000 10000 10000 9998 9980 9908
MO 10000 10000 10000 10000 10000 10000
OH 10000 10000 10000 10000 9999 9971
FL 10000 10000 10000 10000 10000 10000
NV 10000 10000 9977 9683 9277 8838
WI 0 0 48 624 1543 2456
IA 0 0 0 5 74 285
NH 0 0 0 7 54 300
• See notes to Table 4.
• The prices (base probabilities) from Table 1 for September 21 are:
MO 85.0, WV 77.0, OH 72.0, FL 70.0, NV 69.9, WI 62.0, IA 55.0,
NH 55.0, PA 43.0, MN 40.5, NM 40.0, OR 35.0, MI 29.9.
• PA, NM, MN, OR, and MI were never used.
Campaign Spending
The insights from Tables 6 and 7 can now be used to examine campaign spending
across states. Each possible condition of nature on election day is based on every-
thing that has happened up to the day of the election. Everything includes all the
campaigning that has been done in each state. After all the campaigning is over,
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the ranking assumption says that there is no possible condition of nature in which
Bush wins a state ranked below a state he loses. This is not to say, of course, that
campaigning has no effect on the possible conditions of nature. It is just that once
campaigning is over, the ranking assumption holds.
Consider now the strategy of the Republican party on some date t before the
election. Assume for now that the Republican party does not take into account any
Democratic-party response to its actions. p̂it is the market's estimate at date t of
what the actual probability will be on election day (pi). This estimate obviously
takes into account market participants' views about how much campaigning there
will be in each state. Let reit denote the market's expectation at date t of the amount
the Republican party will spend in state i between date t and election day, and let
deit the similar variable for the Democratic party. The following equation is then
postulated:
pi = p̂it + fi(rit − reit) − gi(dit − deit) + uit (3)
where rit is the actual amount the Republican party spends in state i between date t
and election day and dit is the similar variable for the Democratic party. Equation
(3) says that spending in a state affects the probability of winning the state. The
Republican party faces a budget constraint that the sum of rit across all the states
cannot exceed some amount, and similarly for the Democratic party.
Assume that decisions are being made on date t equal to September 7, so t
is xed, and assume for now that dit does not respond to changes in rit. If the
Republican party wants to maximize the probability of winning the election, what
should it do? Consider rst the case in which the variance of uit in equation (3)
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is zero for all i. In this case under the ranking assumption the Republican party
simply maximizes the probability of winning the pivotal state. In Table 1 for
September 7 the pivotal state is Nevada (assuming 270 electoral votes needed to
win), which has a price of 60.0. The state above it is Florida, with a price of 60.5.
The next state is Ohio, with a price of 63.0, and the next state is Missouri with a
price of 67.0. To take an example, say the Republican party's budget constraint
is such that the party can spend in Nevada, Florida, and Ohio to raise pi to 65.0
each. The probability of winning has thus increased from .60 to .65, and there has
been spending in just three states. (In this example there would be in the end no
conditions of nature on election day in which Bush won one or two of these states
and lost the other.)
Consider next the case in which the variance of uit is not zero. Remember
that the uit are state-specic errors of estimation. On date t (September 7) the
Republican party knows that it can change the actual probabilities that will exist
on election day, but when there are estimation errors it does not know the actual
values that will exit. What should be the objective of the party in this case? Go
back to the stochastic-simulation results in Table 6 and assume that the 13 states in
the table are in play. Let rt denote the vector of the 13 rit values, and let ut denote
the vector of the 13 uit values. Given rt and ut, it is straightforward to compute
the probability that the Republican party wins the election. The values of pi can
be computed from equation (3) (assuming also knowledge of reit, dit, and d
e
it) and
then the values ranked to determine the pivotal-state value. For the given value of
rt this can be done, say, for 10,000 draws of ut. This gives 10,000 values of the
probability of winning the election, from which summary measures like those in
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Table 6 can be computed.
One can think of the Republican party considering many values of rt and
for each value computing 10,000 probabilities and summary measures like those
in Table 6. Its objective might be to choose rt to maximize the median of the
probability values, the minimum of the values, or the value below which 5 percent
of the trial values lie. This last optionmeans that therewould be a 95 percent chance
that the actual probability of winning on election day is above themaximized value.
Whatever is maximized, Table 6 shows that when the variance of the errors is zero
the optimal strategy for the party would be to allocate some of its spending to states
belowNevada, the pivotal state when the variance of the errors is zero. Some states
that are below Nevada now have, depending on the draw for ut, some chance of
being pivotal, and so it would be optimal to spend something on these states.
The addition of uncertainty has thus increased the number of states in which
spending is done. Table 6 shows that as the variance of the errors increases, the
number of states that are sometimes pivotal increases. Thus, the larger the variance,
the larger the number of states in which spending is done. It is still the case, of
course, that in most states no spending is done.
Consider nally the Democratic-party response to a Republican-party move,
i.e., relax the assumption that dit is xed. . In any given presidential election the
two parties generally have similar resources and similar information. It also seems
likely that the effects of spending on votes are similar between the two parties.
If there is complete symmetry between the two parties and, say, the Republicans
move rst, then the Democrats can merely offset whatever the Republicans do. In
practice this seems to be roughly the case. Both parties focus their spending on the
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swing states and come close to matching each other by state in terms of number of
visits by the candidates and advertising spending. If one party begins to do more in
a key state, the other party tends to respond. Also, there is essentially no spending
in many states, which, as discussed next, is consistent with the ranking assumption
but not the independence assumption.
No attempt is made in this paper to set up a formal game between the two
parties under the ranking assumption. This is a possibly interesting area for future
work. With a probability structure like that in Table 1, where many states are close
to zero or 100, it seems clear from the results in Table 6 that if a game is set up
using the ranking assumption, there are likely to bemany states in which there is no
spending by either party. This is contrary to results in the literature that are based
on the independence assumption. In the model of Snyder (1989), for example,
spending is high in states that are close and that have a high probability of being
pivotal, but there is some spending in all states. The same is true for the model
in Strömberg (2002). In the model of Brams and Davis (1974) there is spending
in all states, where spending is in proportion to the 3/2's power of the number of
electoral votes in each state.
6 Conclusion
This paper provides an interpretation of the uncertainty that exists at the beginning
of the day of an election as to who will win. It is based on the theory that there are a
number of possible conditions of nature that can exist on election day, of which one
is drawn. Political betting markets like Intrade provide a way of trying to estimate
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this uncertainty. Polling standard errors, on the other hand, do not provide estimates
of this type of uncertainty. They estimate sample-size uncertainty, which can be
driven close to zero with a large enough sample.
This paper also introduces a ranking assumption, which puts restrictions on the
possible conditions of nature than can exist on election day. The joint hypothesis
that the last-day Intrade ranking is correct and the ranking assumption is correct
predicts the exact outcomes of the 2004 presidential election and the 2006 Senate
election. Although not a test of the ranking assumption, there is evidence that
the Intrade traders used the ranking assumption to price contracts in the 2004
presidential election. This was not the case, however, in the 2006 Senate election.
Under the assumption that the ranking assumption is correct, the stochastic
simulation results in Section 5 show that the two political parties should spend
only in a few states. The larger the variance of the estimation errors, the larger is
the number of states in play, although even for large variances the number of states
in play is small.
Finally, given the success of the ranking assumption in 2004 and 2006, it will
be interesting to see how it does in the 2008 election. Regarding polling standard
errors, this paper should not be interpreted as an attack on polls. All it says is that
there is a type of uncertainty that is not estimated by polling standard errors but
that can be estimated using political betting markets.
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